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Abstract
While behavioral research on forecasting has mostly examined the individual forecaster, organizationally-based forecasting
processes typically tend to rely on groups with members from different functional areas for arriving at ‘consensus’ forecasts. The
forecasting performance could also vary depending on the particular group structuring utilized in reaching a final prediction.
The current study compares the forecasting performance of modified consensus groups with that of staticized groups using
formal role-playing. It is found that, when undistorted model forecasts are given, group forecasts (whether they are arrived
at through averaging or by a detailed discussion of the forecasts) contribute positively to the forecasting accuracy. However,
providing distorted initial forecasts affects the final accuracy with varying degrees of improvement over the initial forecasts.
The results show a strong tendency to favor optimistic forecasts for both the staticized and modified consensus group forecasts.
Overall, the role modifications are found to be successful in eliciting a differential adjustment behavior, effectively mimicking
the disparities between different organizational roles. Current research suggests that group discussions may be an efficient
method of displaying and resolving differential motivational contingencies, potentially leading to group forecasts that perform
quite well.
c⃝ 2010 International Institute of Forecasters. Published by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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The effectiveness of the supply chain planning ac-
tivity is usually heavily reliant on the accuracy of the
demand forecasts. The consequences of significant in-
accuracies can be very large, either in lost sales or in
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doi:10.1016/j.ijforecast.2010.03.001excess inventory (Worthen, 2003). To obtain the most
accurate forecasts, this task is generally undertaken by
teams which include representatives from areas such
as marketing, production and forecasting, typically
aided by computer-based forecasting support systems
(Fildes, Goodwin, Lawrence, & Nikolopoulos, 2009).
Each of the members of the forecasting team brings
their own knowledge base and their organisational per-
formance incentives to the complex task of agreeing
on a consensus forecast. Even though the value of
ters. Published by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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processes in contexts such as supply chain manage-
ment is indisputable, a review of the extant research
on forecasting behaviour leads to two main concerns.
Firstly, most behavioural research in forecasting
has focused on the individual performing a forecasting
task (Lawrence, Goodwin, O’Connor, & O¨nkal, 2006).
In an experimental setting, the research participant
is generally given a cover story asking him/her to
play a functional role (e.g., marketing manager) and
to make as accurate a forecast as possible. Advice
may be provided via a forecasting support system,
which typically displays a plot of the time series and
the baseline forecasts for the upcoming periods, as
well as any additional information relating to external
factors (such as a planned promotion) which is not
included in the suggested baseline forecast, if relevant.
Although the participants are requested to play a
specific functional role, no guidance is given as to
what that role involves, apart from making an accurate
forecast. A consistent finding in this area of work is a
tendency to adjust forecasts when they should be left
unadjusted, as well as, surprisingly, a tendency to not
always adjust when the information provided indicates
that an adjustment is needed (e.g., an event such as an
upcoming promotion which is not incorporated in the
presented forecast) (Goodwin & Fildes, 1999; Lim &
O’Connor, 1996).
Secondly, the small amount of work that has been
done on group forecasts (e.g. Ang & O’Connor, 1991;
Sniezek, 1989) has used peer groups where the mem-
bers’ roles are undifferentiated. Clearly, the influence
of organisational role is very significant in any judg-
mental task such as constructing a forecast. Lawrence,
O’Connor, and Edmundson (2000) reported differing
attitudes to the sign of the forecast error1 (from a pos-
itive sign to zero to a negative sign) in the executives
they interviewed. These attitudes appeared to reflect
organisational incentive structures; and furthermore,
the actual realised forecast biases were in line with
these attitudes. Dearborn and Simon (1958) demon-
strated that company executives each viewed organi-
sational problem solving from the perspective of their
own department. Thus, a marketing executive and a
production executive would be likely to adopt quite
1 Indicating whether the forecast is over or under the actual value.different positions on the question of forecast errors, as
the areas of marketing and production generally have
conflicting attitudes to over- and under-forecasting.
Optimism is pervasive in marketing forecasts (Fildes
et al., 2009), while production is generally concerned
with keeping inventories low through what they see
as “realistic” (lower) forecasts. Both knowledge and
values differ across organisational roles, and jointly
influence the way in which a forecasting problem is
understood and estimated.
The current study aims to address these two sig-
nificant concerns by experimentally replicating the
typical organisational forecasting environment, in
which a statistically-based prediction is provided to
a forecasting/decision-making group, which then de-
cides on a final forecast by either accepting the given
forecast or adjusting it (Fildes et al., 2009). The mem-
bership of the forecasting group we have adopted com-
prises the three typical roles of marketing, production
and forecasting. We examine various group effects by
first seeking an independent individual forecast from
each role-assigned group member who is provided
with an initial statistical prediction. The average of
these independent forecasts is termed the ‘staticized’
(i.e., composite) forecast, with previous work arguing
for the potential benefits of such averaging across in-
dividual assessors (e.g. Clemen, 1989; Einhorn, Hog-
arth, & Klempner, 1977; Lawrence, Edmundson, &
O’Connor, 1986). Secondly, we investigate the ‘modi-
fied consensus group’ approach, which may offer dis-
tinct advantages for forecasting in a group setting
(Ang & O’Connor, 1991). In this approach, an ini-
tial statistical forecast is presented to the group to act
as an anchor for their discussions, and the group is
then asked to either accept or adjust this provided pre-
diction in order to reach a final consensus forecast.
The effect of the group discussion while arriving at
a consensus decision can be measured by a compari-
son of the accuracy of the staticized/composite fore-
cast with that of the modified consensus group fore-
cast. We anticipate that the group discussion will im-
prove the forecast (Cooke & Kernaghan, 1987; Hill,
1982; Mannes, 2009), and hence that the consensus
group forecast will be significantly more accurate than
the staticized/composite forecast.
The value of the group discussion may depend
significantly on the accuracy of the initial forecast.
For example, if the initial forecast is good, there
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initial forecast is bad, and thus requires a forecast
adjustment to be made. To explore the potential effects
of different initial forecast conditions, the current
study uses model forecasts (i.e., undistorted forecasts
obtained from a statistical model) versus distorted
forecasts (i.e., model forecasts that are purposefully
inflated or deflated). The goal is to explore the ability
of the group setting to improve on the initial forecasts.
The “anchor and adjustment” heuristic (Lawrence &
O’Connor, 1995) suggests that a poor anchor leads
to worse individual forecasts. However, the group
discussion, particularly when the group membership
includes differentiated roles, may not be impacted so
negatively by a poor initial forecast. We review the
pertinent research literature in the next section and lay
out the specifics of our research hypotheses.
2. Literature review and hypotheses
A critical majority of studies in forecasting and
decision-making concentrate on individuals, even
though many key forecasts and decisions in political,
economic, environmental, and organisational settings
are made by groups (Lawrence et al., 2006; Milch,
Weber, Appelt, Handgraaf, & Krantz, 2009). Convinc-
ing evidence has been provided to show that there are
qualitative differences between individual and group
decision-making behaviors (e.g. Insko et al., 1987). It
has been argued that individuals tend to behave dif-
ferently when they make individual decisions relative
to when they are in a group (Song, 2008). Moreover,
group decisions are often not the simple sum or av-
erage of individual members’ decisions — the broad
body of work examining the effectiveness of group de-
cision making supports the superiority of group deci-
sions over either that of the individual, or the statistical
average of the group’s individual members (Cooke &
Kernaghan, 1987; Erden, von Krogh, & Nonaka, 2008;
Hill, 1982; Mannes, 2009; Peterson, Mitchell, Thomp-
son, & Burr, 2000).
In a recent detailed field study of sales forecast-
ing performance, Fildes et al. (2009) examined sales
forecasting processes in four large UK-based organi-
zations. In each of these organizations, groups with
representatives from marketing, sales, production, and
forecasting were used to arrive at the final company
forecasts through reviewing the statistical forecastsprovided and agreeing on adjustments when needed.
With a large database containing original statistical
forecasts, final company forecasts and actual sales re-
sults, Fildes et al. (2009) investigated the resulting
accuracy of the company adjustments to the statisti-
cal forecasts, and found a persistent tendency toward
optimism, as well as an excess of small adjustments,
which did not improve the accuracy. The many small,
unnecessary adjustments were considered to be indica-
tive of insufficient trust in the reliability of the sta-
tistical forecasts, coupled perhaps with an illusion of
control effect (Langer, 1975). This agrees with re-
search findings on the skepticism that forecast users
show toward the forecast advice given by statistical
models (O¨nkal, Goodwin, Thomson, Go¨nu¨l, & Pol-
lock, 2009). Interestingly, relatively small perturba-
tions in the forecasting environment have been shown
to have a large impact on forecasters’ willingness to
trust such statistical forecasts. For example, Lawrence,
Goodwin, and Fildes (2002) increased the level of
forecaster participation in structuring computer fore-
casting support systems and found a much higher
rate of adoption of its resulting advice. Providing
explanations for the prepared forecast, as would nor-
mally be done verbally by a forecaster in a fore-
casting meeting, has also been shown to significantly
increase the adoption rate of the prepared statistical
forecast (Go¨nu¨l, O¨nkal, & Lawrence, 2006; Lawrence,
Davies, O’Connor, & Goodwin, 2001). These findings
highlight the potential influence of individual contri-
butions that the members of a forecasting committee
may make on the resulting forecast. On a related topic,
the excessive discounting of statistical forecasts (as re-
ported by Fildes et al., 2009) may also be due to a lack
of status or prestige on the part of the forecasting prac-
titioners, many of whom expressed the opinion that
they lacked standing in the forecasting meetings (pri-
vate communication). When all of the members of the
forecasting group have equal status and the decision
is taken as a consensus, it is possible that the statis-
tical forecast will have greater saliency, resulting in
fewer harmful adjustments by the group. This is ad-
vantageous when the initial forecast forms a sound ba-
sis for the group decision, but may be disadvantageous
when the initial forecast is biased.
Investigating the effects of group interaction pro-
cesses on the forecasting performance in an experi-
mental setting, Ang and O’Connor (1991) found that
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the interval forecasting accuracy, depending on the
difficulty of the relevant time series. Their experimen-
tal setting did not assign different roles to the various
group members; instead, all participants were assigned
the same task of estimating the most accurate fore-
cast by consensus. However, in organisational fore-
casting contexts, each member of a forecasting group
represents a different role, where each role is sub-
ject to disparate organisational incentives and moti-
vations. Thus, the Ang and O’Connor group setting
ignores the potentially significant impact of organi-
sational roles, along with the conflicting environmen-
tal incentives and reward structures that are embedded
within these roles. Supporting this view, Armstrong
(2002, 2006) emphasized the importance of the roles
played by group members. Summarizing the findings
of research on simulated interactions involving con-
flict situations (e.g., political conflicts), he concluded
that more accurate forecasts can be attained by groups
with members playing different roles than by individ-
uals acting independently. Confirmatory evidence in a
group forecasting context came from Sniezek’s (1990)
work with peer groups, which showed no significant
process gains as a result of forecasting exercises per-
formed in groups without any role differences.
Given the potential effects that differential roles
may have on the group forecasting accuracy, the
current study aims to fill this critical gap in the
experimental forecasting literature. Our study uses
three-person groups, with the members assuming the
roles of Marketing Director, Production Director and
Forecasting Executive, and with the particular role
scripts structured to mimic real-life organizational
roles. Previous studies have argued that forecasters,
displaying a sense of ownership in their model
forecasts, tend to make minimal adjustments (Go¨nu¨l,
O¨nkal, & Goodwin, 2009; O¨nkal & Go¨nu¨l, 2005;
Sanders & Ritzman, 2001), while upward (downward)
adjustments are observed with marketing (production)
directors, respectively (e.g. Edmundson, Lawrence,
& O’Connor, 1988; Fildes et al., 2009; Lawrence
et al., 2000). Accordingly, if the role manipulation
is successful, we expect the Forecasting Executive to
follow the statistical forecasts closely, making smaller
adjustments overall (relative to the two other roles),
while the Marketing and Production Directors shouldtend to make upward and downward adjustments,
respectively.
In addition to examining the potential effects of dif-
ferential roles within groups, the current study aims to
compare the forecasting performances of the staticized
versus modified consensus group structures in order to
elicit the impact of the group discussion and consen-
sus forming activity. The staticized structure involves
computing a composite/average forecast over a num-
ber of individual forecasts, and thus should outperform
the accuracy of an individual forecaster (e.g. Blattberg
& Hoch, 1990; Clemen, 1989; Lawrence et al., 1986;
Surowiecki, 2005). Modified consensus groups, on the
other hand, require an initial statistical forecast to be
presented to the group, followed by group discussions,
leading to the development of a final consensus fore-
cast. Since this group process involves averaging, in
addition to the discussion and consensus building ac-
tivities, it may be expected to outperform the average
of the individuals in the group. Even though the influ-
ence of differential role assignments has not been ex-
amined in modified consensus groups, we anticipate
that they will enhance the value of the group activities
in reaching a consensus forecast, as the roles inher-
ently involve conflict in their objectives. While conflict
has been shown to sometimes improve and at other
times reduce group effectiveness and decision making,
for the task of forecasting it is most likely to improve
the team performance, provided that the differences
are not taken personally and there is only task conflict,
not relationship conflict (Cronin & Weingart, 2007;
Jehn & Mannix, 2001; Sniezek & Henry, 1990). This
is because task conflict encourages discussion and the
examination of alternatives in the problem domain.
To systematically examine the potential differences
in forecasting accuracy and adjustment behavior in
these group structures, we use three different initial
forecast conditions: (1) model forecasts, (2) inflated
forecasts, and (3) deflated forecasts. The model
forecasts are obtained by exponential smoothing, a
common forecasting method which is well regarded
for its robust accuracy (Makridakis et al., 1993).
The inflated and deflated forecasts are the model
forecasts increased or decreased by 15% to build in
an intentional bias. Such biases are anticipated to
influence the group members’ forecast adjustments
differentially, as well as providing an opportunity to
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on the group’s performance.
In light of the results revealed by the previous ex-
perimental and field work on individual and group de-
cisions and forecasts, as well as forecast adjustments
(e.g. Fildes, Goodwin, & Lawrence, 2006; Lim &
O’Connor, 1995; Mannes, 2009; Mathews & Diaman-
topoulos, 1986, 1987, 1989, 1990, 1992, 1994; Mc-
Nees, 1990; Sanders, 1992; Wolfe & Flores, 1990), we
hypothesise that when an undistorted model forecast
is provided as an initial forecast, the modified consen-
sus group will be more accurate than the average of
the individual forecasts (i.e., staticized group). Also,
when the prediction being provided as an initial fore-
cast is a robust prediction that is unlikely to be beaten
for forecasting a mathematically generated time series,
we hypothesise that the modified consensus group will
be equal to or better than the initial forecast in ac-
curacy. This hypothesis (for forecasting groups) is in
contrast to the body of research for individual forecast-
ers which has demonstrated that, when provided with
a good prediction, an individual will generally adjust it
and reduce its accuracy (Lawrence et al., 2006). Given
these findings for individual forecasters, we anticipate
that the staticized group forecast (comprising the aver-
age of individual forecasts) will be less accurate than
the initial forecast. In addition, we expect the group
discussion to mediate the tendency to make adjust-
ments, thus leading to fewer adjustments in modified
consensus groups than in staticized groups. Hence, we
formulate the following hypotheses:
H1: When an undistorted model prediction is pro-
vided as the initial forecast:
a. Modified consensus group forecasts will be
more accurate than the staticized group
forecasts.
b. Modified consensus group forecasts will be as
accurate as or more accurate than the initial
forecasts.
c. Staticized group forecasts will be less accurate
than the initial forecasts.
d. Modified consensus groups will make fewer
adjustments to the initial forecasts than the
staticized groups.
Since the quality of the initial predictions may
significantly influence the final forecasts (Goodwin,
2005; Harvey, 2001; Lawrence & O’Connor, 1995),we expect a different set of results when distorted
forecasts are given as initial predictions. In particular,
we anticipate that the inflated initial forecast will be
supported by the member tasked with the Marketing
Director role, but rejected by the member tasked
with the Production Director role in favor of a
lower forecast. On the other hand, the deflated initial
forecast is expected to be rejected by the Marketing
Director in favor of a higher forecast, but supported
by the Production Director. Although we would
anticipate that the member tasked with the Forecasting
Executive role will typically seek to defend the
statistical forecast, (s)he may act differently when
given inflated/deflated forecasts and will potentially
try to bring them in line with the historical data. As
before, we anticipate that the forecasts produced by the
modified consensus group will be more accurate than
those of the staticized group, and also more accurate
than the initial forecast, due to the conflict in the group
encouraging the consideration of all information, thus
leading to a better performance (Sniezek & Henry,
1990). Given distorted initial forecasts, we expect
the staticized group forecasts to be more accurate
than the initial (inflated or deflated) predictions.
Group discussions are also expected to result in more
adjustments being made in the modified consensus
groups, relative to the staticized groups. Accordingly,
we formulate the following hypotheses:
H2: When a distorted (i.e., inflated or deflated) predic-
tion is provided as the initial forecast:
a. Modified consensus group forecasts will be
more accurate than the staticized group fore-
casts.
b. Modified consensus group forecasts will be
more accurate than the initial forecasts.
c. Staticized group forecasts will be more accu-
rate than the initial forecasts.
d. Modified consensus groups will make more ad-
justments to the initial forecasts than the stati-
cized groups.
3. Research methodology
3.1. Participants
The participants were 72 third year business stu-
dents at Bilkent University who were taking a fore-
casting course. No monetary incentives were given,
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their final course grades. Using student participants in
group settings is very common in research on forecast-
ing (as reviewed by Lawrence et al., 2006) and group
decision-making (e.g. Filios, 1992; Valacich, Sarker,
Pratt, & Groomer, 2009). In fact, comparisons of man-
agers and students have revealed very few differences
in the patterns of erratic behavior and bias in the two
groups’ decisions (Mowen & Mowen, 1986), while the
students were argued to be less susceptible to bringing
their organizational/external issues and influences to
the experimental setting, thus presenting a favorable
participant pool (Ruchala, 1999).
3.2. Design
The study involved paper and pencil tasks which
were framed as sales forecasting for the different prod-
ucts of a case study organization. The experiment con-
sisted of three phases, lasting a total of approximately
three hours (with Phases I, II, and III taking around 20,
50, and 110 minutes, respectively).
PHASE I: Information and role initiation
In Phase I, the background information for the or-
ganization was presented (see Appendix A for the
background information on the hypothetical organiza-
tion), and the task requirements were explained using
specific examples. Participants were randomly allo-
cated to three-person groups (making a total of 72/3 =
24 groups), followed by the group members drawing
out unmarked envelopes to randomly pick their roles
as the Forecasting Executive, Marketing Director, or
Production Director. All participants with the same
role were then asked to go into one of three rooms,
where separate preparation sessions were conducted
for each role, to explain the specific role requirements
and to address any questions (see Appendix B for the
role information given to the participants in the Fore-
casting Executive, Marketing Director, and Production
Director roles). At the end of the role-preparation ses-
sions, the participants went to the specific rooms as-
signed to their individual groups for the remaining two
phases of the study.
PHASE II: Staticized group forecasts
In Phase II, the participants were organized into
groups of three subjects in their assigned rooms, but
the individuals were not permitted to talk or exchange
any information. They were given a set of 20 timeseries plots, along with one-period-ahead initial point
forecasts (i.e., computer generated forecasts) and their
individual role scripts (i.e., stories) for each series.
While all of the subjects were presented with the same
set of time series (with different randomized order-
ings), each participant received one of three stories to
match their particular role (see Appendices C–E for
examples of the forms, involving the same time series
as shown in Fig. C.1, given to participants in the Fore-
casting Executive, Marketing Director, and Production
Director roles, respectively). Additionally, for both
Phase II and Phase III, the 24 groups were randomly
divided into three initial forecast conditions, so that
the eight groups in Initial Forecast Condition: ModelF
all received model forecasts as their initial predictions;
while the eight groups in Initial Forecast Condition:
InflatedF all received inflated forecasts, and the eight
groups in Initial Forecast Condition: DeflatedF all
received deflated forecasts as their initial predictions
(more details of the way in which these forecasts were
obtained are presented in the next subsection). For
each of the 20 time series, Phase II required the par-
ticipants to study the given time series, the presented
initial forecast, and their role scripts in order to make
their individual sales forecasts for the next period.
PHASE III: Modified consensus group forecasts
In Phase III, the participants were organized into
their groups and were instructed to engage in group
discussions in order to arrive at consensus forecasts
for each product’s sales in the next period. The set of
rules given to each group prohibited any member act-
ing as a group leader, while asking the participants to:
(i) act out their given roles as they believed they would
be performed in an organization; (ii) act with due con-
sideration for all group members; (iii) let the forecast-
ing executive introduce the initial forecast and record
the consensus forecast; (iv) record their levels of sat-
isfaction with each of the consensus forecasts; and
(v) evaluate each of the group members upon task
completion, along with a self-evaluation. They were
presented with a different set of 20 time series to
that from Phase II, along with the corresponding one-
period-ahead initial point forecasts (i.e., computer ge-
nerated forecasts) and their individual role scripts for
each series. As in the previous phase, all of the sub-
jects were presented with the same set of time se-
ries, but each participant also received one of three
stories to match their particular role. Their previous
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tions (ModelF, InflatedF, or DeflatedF) continued in
Phase III as well. In summary, for each of the 20 new
time series, Phase III required the participants to study
the given time series, the presented initial forecast, and
their role scripts, in order to engage in group discus-
sions and develop consensus sales forecasts.
3.3. Time series and initial forecasts
A set of 40 artificially generated non-seasonal time
series was divided into two equivalent sets containing
20 time series each, to be used in Phases II and III
of the experiment (the two sets showed no statistically
significant differences in either (i) the MAPEs of the
statistical forecasts for the two datasets, or (ii) the
MAPEs of the judgmental forecasts that similar
groups of participants produced for these two datasets
in pilot studies). Each of the two sets of 20 time series
comprised 10 series with low variances and 10 with
high variances (the high variance was equal to three
times the low variance). For each of these sets of 10
series, five were constructed from an AR(1) model
and five from a model with a simple linear trend
plus a random normal deviate. Each series included
one promotion in the last 11 observations, and six
of the 20 series also had a promotion in the period
to be forecast. The promotion impact was generated
by a stochastic function which increased the demand
in the promotion period by 25%–50% and decreased
it in the following period by 15%–40%. Each time
series plot showed 11 past observations and asked
for a forecast for period 12. Period 12’s value was
generated for each of the 40 series so that measures
of forecasting performance could be computed from
the participants’ predictions. The initial forecasts
given to the subjects were obtained via Holt’s Linear
Exponential Smoothing technique. When there was an
upcoming promotion indicated for a product/series, a
separate promotion effect forecast (calculated using
the percentage effect on sales of the previous
promotion for that product/series) was presented to
the participants in addition to the model forecast.
Hence, the participants received a model forecast, a
promotion effect forecast, and a total forecast for each
product with an upcoming promotion, while receiving
only the model forecast for the remaining products
(with no upcoming promotions). Since the participantsare requested to provide ‘final’ forecasts (with no
promotion effect breakdowns), the results given in our
findings section address the predictive performances
of these overall forecasts.
Participants in the Initial Forecast Condition:
ModelF received the undistorted model forecasts, as
was explained above. On the other hand, the Initial
Forecast Condition: InflatedF participants were given
‘inflated’ forecasts (i.e., model forecasts multiplied
by 115%), whereas those in the Initial Forecast
Condition: DeflatedF were presented with ‘deflated’
forecasts (i.e., model forecasts multiplied by 85%).
This modification of ±15% was found to be sufficient
to bring about a significant change in the accuracy
of the given forecasts, such that although the inflated
and deflated forecasts showed equivalent accuracies,
they both performed worse than the undistorted model
forecasts (see Section 4.1 for details).
4. Findings
4.1. Role manipulation
We first need to investigate the forecast bias as a
manipulation check, to examine the influence of the
role assignments given to the participants. If the role
manipulation is successful, we anticipate that the roles
given to the subjects should lead to no bias for the
forecaster role, a positive bias for the marketing role
and a negative bias for the production role. Forecast
bias is measured by the percentage error (PE), defined
as:
PE = {[forecast− realized value]/realized value} × 100.
Table 1 presents the average bias by role for the
forecasts produced in the staticized group study
(where the participants report their individual fore-
casts given their particular role assignments) un-
der the model forecasts condition (where undistorted
model predictions are given as the initial forecasts).
In the table we also present, as a reference point, the
bias for the undistorted model forecasts provided to
the participants. The results in this table show that
the biases from participants assigned the Forecasting
Executive and Marketing and Production Directors’
roles are as was anticipated for these roles, with
significant bias differences (t13 = −2.33, two-
tailed p = 0.037, Cohen’s d = −1.16 for
the Forecasting Executive vs. Marketing Director
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Mean percentage error by role (in the staticized group study for
forecasts given in the model forecast condition).
Mean percentage error
Forecasting Executive role 0.49%
Marketing Director role 8.93%
Production Director role −9.43%
Model forecast −0.64%
comparison; t10 = 3.73, two-tailed p = 0.004,
d = 1.87 for the Forecasting Executive vs. Produc-
tion Director comparison; and t9 = 6.05, two-tailed
p < 0.001, d = 3.02 for the Marketing Director
vs. Production Director comparison). These findings
demonstrate the effectiveness of the role manipulation
used in the experiment.
4.2. Aspects of forecasting performance
Forecast accuracy (as measured by the mean ab-
solute percentage error (MAPE)) and forecast ad-
justment (as measured by the mean percentage
change (MPC) from the initial forecasts given to
the participants) represent the two important as-
pects of the forecasting performance which are
emphasized in this study. While the MAPE ad-
dresses the research hypotheses related to accuracy
(i.e., H1a, H1b, H1c, H2a, H2b, and H2c), the MPC
aids in examining the hypotheses concerning adjust-
ments of the initial forecasts (i.e., H1d and H2d). This
section presents and discusses the findings under each
of these performance categories.
4.2.1. Forecast accuracy
The MAPE, a commonly used measure of forecast-
ing accuracy, is defined as the mean of the absolute
percentage errors (APE) over a set of forecasts, where
APE = {[|forecast− realized value|]/
realized value}∗100.
The MAPE values for the staticized group versus the
modified consensus group forecasts for the three ini-
tial forecast conditions are presented in Table 2, along
with the two-tailed p-values of the relevant pairwise
comparisons. Using a mixed-factorial ANOVA with
the initial forecast condition (ModelF vs. InflatedFvs. DeflatedF) as the between-groups factor and the
group structure (staticized group vs. modified con-
sensus group) as the within-groups factor, significant
main effects were found for both factors (F2,21 =
23.99, p < 0.001, partial η2 = 0.42 for ‘initial
forecast condition’; F1,21 = 16.86, p = 0.001, par-
tial η2 = 0.09 for ‘group structure’), with no addi-
tional significant interaction effects (F2,21 = 2.68,
p = 0.092, partial η2 = 0.03).
As Table 2 shows, when undistorted model fore-
casts are given as initial predictions, the modified con-
sensus group forecasts show a higher accuracy (i.e.,
lower MAPE) than the staticized group forecasts (t9 =
3.02, one-tailed p = 0.007, d = 1.51), supporting
H1a. In addition, the modified consensus group fore-
casts were as accurate as the initial forecasts given to
this group, supporting H1b (t7 = 0.10, two-tailed p =
0.920). The staticized group forecasts are more than
1% less accurate than the initial forecasts (t7 = 4.57,
one-tailed p = 0.0015), thus supporting H1c.
When inflated or deflated predictions are used as
the initial forecasts, the improvement potential in
the MAPE (i.e., the difference between the MAPEs
of the distorted and undistorted forecasts) is around
5%. Interestingly, the modified consensus group and
the staticized group forecasts are equally accurate
when inflated initial predictions are given (t10 =
0.45, two-tailed p = 0.663, d = 0.23); while
the modified consensus group is more accurate
in the case of deflated initial predictions (t13 =
2.67, one-tailed p = 0.010, d = 1.34), with an
accuracy improvement over the initial forecast of
4.2%. Thus, our findings support H2a for deflated
initial predictions, while refuting it for inflated initial
predictions. The modified consensus group forecasts
are found to be more accurate than the initial forecasts
for both the inflated and deflated cases (t7 =
−2.54, one-tailed p = 0.020 for inflated; and
t7 = −4.78, one-tailed p = 0.001 for deflated),
which supports H2b. The staticized forecasts are
also more accurate than the initial distorted forecasts
(t7 = −4.30, one-tailed p = 0.002 for inflated;
t7 = −1.91, one-tailed p = 0.048 for deflated),
supporting H2c.
4.2.2. Forecast adjustment
The percentage change (PC) from the initial
predictions is used to examine the forecast adjustment
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Mean absolute percentage errors for the staticized and modified consensus group forecasts, with initial forecast condition breakdowns (with
lower MAPE scores indicating a better forecast accuracy).
Initial forecast condition
ModelF InflatedF DeflatedF
Staticized group forecasts (SGF) 13.80% 18.01% 16.01%
Initial forecasts given to the staticized group 12.52% 19.77% 17.33%
Modified consensus group forecasts (MCGF) 11.50% 17.59% 13.12%
Initial forecasts given to the modified consensus group 11.43% 19.71% 17.11%
SGF vs MCGF (p-value) 0.014* 0.663 0.019*
SGF vs Initial forecasts (p-value) 0.003** 0.004** 0.097
MCGF vs Initial forecasts (p-value) 0.920 0.039* 0.002**
∗ p < 0.05.
∗∗ p < 0.01.behavior. In particular:
PC = {[group forecast− initial forecast]/
initial forecast}∗100.
The mean of the percentage changes over a set of
group forecasts yields MPC, which provides useful
information about the positive/negative adjustment
from the initially provided forecasts.
Fig. 1 summarizes the MPC values for the stati-
cized group versus the modified consensus group fore-
casts for the three initial forecast conditions. In the
staticized group case, the MPC for the ModelF condi-
tion is significantly higher than zero (t7 = 1.96; p =
0.045 for testing H0: µ = 0 vs. Ha: µ > 0), mean-
ing that the staticized forecasts are significantly over-
adjusted when undistorted model forecasts are given.
On the other hand, when inflated forecasts are given,
no sizeable positive/negative adjustments are observed
(t7 = −1.67; p = 0.140 for testing H0: µ = 0 vs. Ha:
µ ≠ 0). Similarly, when deflated forecasts are given,
the forecasts are not significantly over/under-adjusted
relative to the initial predictions (t7 = 0.97; p = 0.362
for testing H0: µ = 0 vs. Ha: µ ≠ 0), signaling that
statistical averaging appears to yield predictions that
are not responsive to the distorted forecasts given to
them.
A different picture emerges for forecast adjust-
ments in modified consensus groups. When undis-
torted model forecasts are given, the mean percentage
change does not differ significantly from zero (t7 =
0.39; p = 0.710 for testing H0: µ = 0 vs. Ha: µ ≠ 0),
indicating no positive/negative adjustments to the ini-
tial forecasts. When deflated predictions are given, thegroup forecasts are adjusted to be considerably higher
than the initial predictions, resulting in an overall sig-
nificant positive adjustment (t7 = 5.63; p < 0.001 for
testing H0: µ = 0 vs. Ha: µ > 0), suggesting that
the groups realize that the given forecasts are deflated,
and therefore act to correct for this. A similar recogni-
tion appears in the inflated forecasts condition, where
the groups adjust their forecasts to be noticeably lower
than the given predictions, leading to an overall signif-
icant negative adjustment (t7 = −2.49; p = 0.021 for
testing H0: µ = 0 vs. Ha : µ < 0).
Although the modified consensus group forecast
adjustments appear to be more than those of the stati-
cized group for the inflated and deflated initial forecast
conditions, these differences in the mean percentage
change are not sufficient to achieve statistical signif-
icance, and hence H2d is not supported. In addition,
H1d is not supported either. In particular, there do not
appear to be any significant differences between the
two group structures with respect to their propensity
to adjust the initial predictions, regardless of whether
they are provided with undistorted (t13 = 1.00; p =
0.334, d = 0.50 for model forecasts as initial pre-
dictions) or distorted initial forecasts (t10 = 1.52;
p = 0.160, d = 0.76 for inflated forecasts as initial
predictions; t8 = −0.89; p = 0.398, d = −0.45 for
deflated forecasts as initial predictions). This lack of
significance could stem from the relatively low statis-
tical power of the tests, due to the sample size issues
which are typically associated with group research,
and which may, in turn, instigate the large variation ob-
served within groups (e.g., in the deflated initial fore-
cast condition, the MPC ranges between −10% and
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greater adjustment).+17% for the staticized group and between +1% and
+11% for the modified consensus group).
Fig. 2 summarizes the effects of the experimental
role manipulation on forecast adjustments for the stati-
cized case (where the individual forecasts were given
by participants in the three roles). It can be observed
that the participants assigned the Forecasting Execu-
tive role made fewer adjustments than the members in
the other roles for the undistorted and inflated initial
forecast conditions, displaying their overall sense of
ownership of the model forecasts (all p < 0.05). The
only exception to this is for the deflated initial fore-
cast condition, where the participants in the Forecast-
ing Executive and Production Director roles appear to
make forecast adjustments of similar magnitudes (t8 =
−0.03, p = 0.973, d = −0.02 for testing for differ-
ences in absolute magnitudes), albeit in opposite direc-
tions; with both roles making fewer adjustments than
the participants in the Marketing Director role (t10 =
5.15, p < 0.001, d = 2.57 for the comparison with
the Forecasting Executive role; t7 = 5.71, p = 0.001,
d = 2.85 for the comparison with the Production
Director role). Those subjects who are in the Market-
ing Director role seem to make positive adjustments
under all forecast conditions, with the largest posi-
tive adjustments being made when deflated forecastsare given. It appears that these participants are con-
sistent in their upward adjustments of given forecasts,
thus closely following their initial scripts in making
a concerted effort to increase the model predictions.
Similarly, those participants who were in the Produc-
tion Director role appear to have followed their role
descriptions in reducing the model predictions under
all forecast conditions. These participants make their
largest negative adjustments when inflated forecasts
are given, while making smaller adjustments when de-
flated forecasts are provided.
To gain further insights into the consensus forecast-
ing behavior of the groups in the three forecast condi-
tions, we also analyzed the agreement scores that the
participants assigned to each of the consensus fore-
casts they gave in Phase III (the modified consensus
group study) of the experiment. Fig. 3 summarizes
the mean levels of agreement by role. For each of the
initial forecast conditions, as well as aggregated over
all conditions, those participants who were playing
the Forecasting Executive role showed a significantly
higher agreement with the consensus than the partic-
ipants in either the Marketing Director or Production
Director roles (all p < 0.005 for two-sample t-tests
of comparisons of (i) Forecasting Executive vs. Mar-
keting Director roles; and (ii) Forecasting Executive
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adjustment).Fig. 3. Mean levels of agreement (out of 5, where 1 = totally disagree; 5 = totally agree), together with the group consensus for modified
consensus group participants, along with role and initial forecast condition breakdowns.vs. Production Director roles). On the other hand, the
participants in the Marketing and Production Director
roles displayed no significant differences in their levels
of agreement with the group consensus (all p > 0.10
for two-sample t-tests of comparisons of the Market-
ing Director and Production Director roles).5. Discussion and limitations
Our findings may be summarized as follows:
(1) The modified consensus group forecasts are more
accurate than the staticized group forecasts when
either undistorted model predictions or deflated
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but not when inflated predictions are given
(supporting H1a while providing mixed evidence
for H2a, depending on inflated vs. deflated initial
predictions);
(2) The modified consensus group forecasts are more
accurate than the initial forecasts when either in-
flated or deflated predictions are given (supporting
H2b), while yielding an accuracy equal to that of
the initial forecasts when undistorted model pre-
dictions are given (supporting H1b);
(3) The staticized group forecasts are less accuracte
than the initial forecasts when undistorted model
predictions are given (supporting H1c), while be-
ing more accurate than the initial predictions for
the inflated/deflated forecast conditions (support-
ing H2c); and
(4) No significant differences could be found between
the two group structures in their propensity to
adjust the initial predictions, regardless of whether
they are provided with undistorted or distorted
initial forecasts (refuting H1d and H2d).
Our findings highlight the potential gains that may
accrue from using groups, with the modified consen-
sus group structure in particular leading to more ac-
curate forecasts than the staticized group structure
when either undistorted or deflated predictions are
given as the initial forecasts. However, when the initial
forecasts are inflated, the superiority of the modified
consensus group appears to be eliminated. This could
potentially be a byproduct of the optimism bias,
with the participants not wanting to ‘touch’ positive-
looking forecasts. In addition, the results could arise
from the risky-shift phenomenon, which is encoun-
tered in groups where the members end up making
riskier decisions than would be the case if they were to
make the same choices individually. Such inclinations
towards risky alternatives may be due to (i) the diffu-
sion of responsibility which is associated with group
settings (Wallach, Kogan, & Bem, 1964); (ii) the as-
sociation of risk-taking with a higher social status in
groups (Brown, 1965); (iii) the psychology of focusing
on riskier alternatives leading to an illusion of a lower
perceived risk, due to the familiarity and/or comfort
which is brought about by such a focus (Bateson,
1966); or (iv) a risk-taking member being inherentlymore overconfident, and hence persuading the other
team members easily (Collins & Guetzkow, 1964).
Our results relating to the modified consensus
group forecasts do not concur with the repeated re-
search finding that judgmental interventions degrade
the accuracy of statistical predictions (Lawrence et al.,
2006). This may be viewed as an important caveat to
be added to the previous research findings, which have
primarily been based on individual forecasters. Inter-
estingly, averaging individual forecasts (i.e., the stati-
cized group) only leads to a statistically improved ac-
curacy compared to the initial forecasts when distorted
forecasts are given. In situations when undistorted ini-
tial forecasts are given, averaging does not seem to
propagate sufficient wisdom to outperform the accu-
racy of the model forecasts. However, the real benefits
of averaging surface when the initial predictions are
inflated/deflated, indicating the individual forecasters’
immediate recognition of predictions that ‘do not look
right’. It is worth noting that a further benefit of av-
eraging involves the avoidance of typically repetitive,
time-consuming and expensive meetings, especially
for cases where the accuracy advantages may be neg-
ligible, or where organizational concerns dictate per-
formance criteria other than predictive accuracy.
Overall, the results showed that there is a strong
tendency to favor higher forecasts for both the stati-
cized and modified consensus group forecasts, reflect-
ing the bias toward optimism which was reported by
Fildes et al. (2009), as well as the widely observed
heuristic favoring upward trending economic series re-
ported in many studies (see Lawrence et al., 2006).
This tendency toward optimism was demonstrated by
the relatively small adjustments reducing the inflated
forecasts slightly, compared to the much larger adjust-
ments increasing the deflated forecasts. In other words,
although the subjects responded and reduced the bias
when given distorted initial forecasts, the response was
minimal in the inflated condition but much stronger
in the deflated condition. This resulted in different
forecasting accuracy profiles for the staticized and
modified consensus group forecasts across the initial
forecast conditions.
Contrary to our expectations, no significant differ-
ences could be found between the two group structures
with respect to their propensity to adjust the initial
predictions across any of the forecast conditions.
Although we expected the superior performance of the
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scores relative to the staticized group) for the deflated
forecast condition to arise mostly from adjustments
which are significant and in the right direction, we
could not find any statistical evidence of this. This is
interesting in light of the divergent adjustment patterns
found for the three roles. These results may be viewed
as suggesting that the role assignment dominates the
adjustment behavior and that the group discussion
does not appear to have any unique influence over and
above this ‘role framing’. That is, the participants may
have been so engrossed in game playing that their fo-
cus was not on making accurate consensus forecasts,
but rather on following their role scripts as closely as
possible. A related explanation may be that, since the
participants are used to making their own forecasts
in Phase II (staticized group phase), this effect spills
over to Phase III (modified consensus group phase).
That is, the participants may prefer to make their own
implicit forecasts prior to starting their group discus-
sions, which, in effect, may lead to an egocentric bias
blocking any positive process gains from group dis-
cussions. Such a powerful anchoring on one’s own
forecasts may have preempted learning from the in-
formation exchange that would ordinarily be expected
to take place in groups. Future work exploring the
potential effects of assessing overt vs. covert prior
forecasts under differently structured group methods
would be very beneficial in addressing these issues. In
particular, comparative studies using structured group
techniques in forecasting settings with varying levels
of predictability deserve special consideration (Rowe
& Wright, 1996; Wright & Goodwin, 2009). Such
work would be especially important in analyzing the
interactions of information sharing and uncertainty
management in group forecasts, as well as extending
previous research on teams and information dissem-
ination (e.g. Hill, Bartol, Tesluk, & Langa, 2009;
LePine, Piccolo, Jackson, Mathieu, & Saul, 2008;
Mesmer-Magnus & DeChurch, 2009).
We had expected task conflict to mediate our re-
sults on interactive groups, when in fact our find-
ings revealed high levels of agreement among group
members. Given our experimental structure and the
instructions, which were designed to minimize af-
fective conflict within role assignments, our expecta-
tion was for task conflict to improve the performance
across all forecast conditions. While the study wassuccessful in communicating the intended roles (with
those assigned the Forecasting Executive role display-
ing the most resistance to changing the given forecasts,
while the Marketing Directors pushed the forecasts
up and the Production Directors pulled the forecasts
down), our design may have inadvertently prevented
the participants from benefiting from group discus-
sions, thus effectively restricting the performance po-
tential of group forecasting. Possible limitations that
may stem from the experimental framework need to
be noted. For instance, we had to use two equivalent
sets of time series for the staticized and modified con-
sensus group forecasts in order to avoid confounding.
Alternative experimental designs could be utilized to
compare the two group structures using a common
set of time series. Also, the relatively long duration
of the experiment may have led to fewer adjustments
in the last phase (where forecasts were made via the
modified consensus groups). Although no lack of mo-
tivation or tiredness effects were mentioned in post-
experimental discussions for any of the phases, it is
possible that the participants made fewer adjustments
in Phase III in order to avoid lengthy discussions with
other group members, and thus end the study quickly.
Another potential limitation may arise from possible
learning effects between Phases II and III. Given that
the participants were students in a forecasting course
and were thus accustomed to participating in forecast-
ing competitions throughout the semester, no signifi-
cant learning effects were expected over the duration
of the study. However, it is possible that the particu-
lar role structures utilized in the experiment facilitated
different task learning processes, thus partially con-
tributing to the results. Future studies designed to sys-
tematically investigate these potential effects should
prove useful in designing improved forecasting sup-
port processes for groups.
In addition, the current work has not examined the
possible effects on accuracy and role performance of
providing various incentives. Even though both the
verbal and written instructions at the beginning of the
study clearly emphasized the main goal to be an im-
proved forecast accuracy, it could be that the partici-
pants perceived the task as predominantly being a role-
game, with the primary goal of following their stated
role descriptions. Using differential incentive schemes
to reward both the fit with the role descriptions and
the group forecasting accuracy poses a promising
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forecasts. Similarly, further work with managers in
actual company settings would facilitate the deve-
lopment of interactive measures of conflict, thus ena-
bling a more detailed analysis of role conflict. This
could be expected to contribute significantly to our un-
derstanding of group dynamics and forecasting behav-
ior under varying levels of conflict subject to organi-
zational pressures and uncertainty.
6. Conclusions
This paper has explored the dynamics of forecast
adjustment in group settings with formal role assign-
ments and differences in initial forecast conditions.
Its findings showed that the judgmental adjustments
reflect the recognition of inflated and deflated fore-
casts, resulting in differential modifications to correct
the distortions in the initial forecasts. In particular, in-
flated initial forecasts were adjusted downwards, but
not to the same extent as the upward adjustments
made in response to the deflated initial forecasts.
Furthermore, the modified consensus group forecasts
improved upon the accuracy of the initial forecasts
for the inflated/deflated situations, while being equally
accurate in the case of the undistorted model predic-
tions. While the group discussions involved with con-
structing the modified consensus group forecasts im-
proved the accuracy over that of the staticized group
forecasts when either deflated or undistorted model
predictions were given, an optimism bias apparently
prevented such an accuracy boost when inflated pre-
dictions were provided as the initial forecasts. Over-
all, the role modifications were successful in eliciting
a differential adjustment behavior, effectively mim-
icking the disparities among different organizational
roles.
The current results suggest that group discussions
may be an efficient method of displaying and resolv-
ing differential motivational contingencies, potentially
leading to group forecasts that perform quite well. In-
stead of the multi-tier forecast adjustments that are
commonly made in organizations (O¨nkal, Go¨nu¨l, &
Lawrence, 2008), group forecasts provide a common
platform on which to make a ‘joint’ adjustment, with
shared responsibilities. A recent survey of business
forecasters has shown that taking responsibility for
forecasts is given as one of the primary reasons forindividual forecast modifications (Go¨nu¨l et al., 2009),
at times leading to a questionable prediction quality.
The current work proposes a way forward, with or-
ganizational forecasting teams formally sharing their
informational advantages and assuming a reciprocated
accountability for the resulting predictions. Future ex-
tensions of this research that capitalize on the group
dynamics in order to support organizational sense-
making will prove immensely valuable for enhancing
the effectiveness of group-based judgmental forecast-
ing.
Appendix A. Background information on the case
study organization
A.1. The Delta Gizmo Company
The Delta Gizmo Company manufactures hand gar-
den tools which are sold through specialised retailers,
as well as at large discount stores. The company has a
program of special promotions to bring its products to
the notice of customers, where each of its key products
is promoted regularly on a rotating basis.
Each month, Delta Gizmo produces one-month-
ahead forecasts for its production. These forecasts are
produced just before the start of each month for the
following month. For instance, the forecast for July
is produced in late May, when the sales for May are
pretty well determined. Delta Gizmo is naturally keen
to forecast as accurately as possible in order to reduce
the potential costs: firstly, the cost of over-production
and the associated storage cost; and secondly, the cost
of lost sales due to running out of stock as a result of
under-production.
The company forecast for each product is produced
by the Forecasting Committee, comprising the
Marketing Director, the Forecasting Executive (who
is also the Chief Information Officer, CIO), and
the Production Director. At their monthly meetings,
they review the following before agreeing upon the
company forecasts:
(i) Statistical forecasts (produced in advance using
the computerised forecasting system) provided by
the Forecasting Executive;
(ii) The promotion plans and market intelligence
(MI) of the marketing department, conveyed by
the Marketing Director; and
(iii) Relevant production issues brought out by the
Production Director.
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comes the company forecast input for the production
planning and inventory control system.
For some time, Delta Gizmo has been seeking to
foster an improved culture where its executives work
harmoniously towards the organisation’s objective of
increasing the accuracy of its forecasts. This is the ini-
tiative of its chief executive officer (CEO), who has
been concerned by the tendency for forecasts to be
too optimistic, reflecting, he believes, the excessive
optimism of the marketing executives and their de-
sire to have sufficient stock in case the promotion is
as successful as they hope for. To help improve the
working relationships, the CEO has asked the Fore-
casting, Marketing and Production Directors to draft
brief comments on each of the key products before the
meeting, so that the others can be forewarned of any
issues that may need to be addressed.
The discussions at the forecasting meetings have
been harmonious, although the Production Director
and Forecasting Executive generally work hard to tone
down the Marketing Director by reminding him/her
about previous experiences, with comments such as,
“That is what you told us last time around, and we only
scored about 80% of what you said the extra would be.
Just look at the figures!”. On the other hand, the Mar-
keting Director reminds the Forecasting Executive and
Production Director of previous examples of success-
ful promotions, where the sales exceeded all expecta-
tions and they ran out of stock, with high costs in lost
sales. In the past, the Marketing Director’s power in
these meetings has enabled marketing’s will to prevail.
However, with the new initiative of the CEO, the three
members of the Forecasting Committee need to agree
upon the final forecast unanimously, thus reaching a
consensus forecast for each product.
Appendix B. Role information given to partici-
pants in the ‘Forecasting Executive’, ‘Marketing
Director’, and ‘Production Director’ roles
B.1. The Forecasting Executive (Chief Information
Officer — CIO)
The Forecasting Executive is one of the executives
who report directly to the CEO. The major responsi-
bility of this position is the development of the mostaccurate possible forecasts for the company. You, as
the Forecasting Executive, believe that the profitabil-
ity of the company is mainly dependent on the suc-
cess of its forecasts, as production is based on them,
which can in turn either reduce or increase the inven-
tory and manufacturing costs. Therefore, you feel that
your position is superior to the other positions report-
ing to the CEO. You personally believe that since your
appointment as the CIO, Delta Gizmo’s success has
been due primarily to the excellent job you have done
in the forecasting department.
Considerable investments have been made in the
last few years for upgrading the computer information
systems of Delta Gizmo. The upgraded systems in-
clude a state-of-the-art computerised forecasting sys-
tem, which has been demonstrated to be as accurate
as possible, given the randomness of the data. In ad-
dition, the computer forecasts so far appear to be
more accurate than those previously prepared by the
Sales and Marketing Departments. Each month, you,
as the Forecasting Executive, make sure that the job
of massaging the data base (with the help of the fore-
casting software) is being done properly, in order to
remove the impacts of special events such as promo-
tions. This is needed for the baseline forecast to be as
accurate as possible. You review each forecast care-
fully before the Forecast Committee meeting. At each
monthly Forecasting Meeting, you collaborate with
the Marketing and Production Directors to achieve the
best possible company forecasts by working on the
computer forecasts and any additional data brought
forward by these directors. However, you, as the ex-
ecutive in charge of preparing the computerised fore-
casts, feel quite strongly that changes to these should
only be made when a promotion is coming up or if
someone in the meeting can see a problem with the
computer forecast. Since the CEO has taken steps to
increase the power of the Forecasting Executive’s po-
sition in the Forecast Committee, you feel much more
comfortable in asserting the accuracy of the computer
forecasts. Your one concern, however, is that you have
not been formally trained in forecasting, and nor has
anyone else in your unit. Therefore, you feel vulner-
able when you are challenged on the need to change
forecasts due to observed patterns in the time series
that seem not to be reflected in the computer forecast.
This does happen from time to time, as even the best
forecast can be wrong and need to be modified.
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The Marketing Director is one of the executives
who report directly to the CEO. The main responsibil-
ity of this position is to run the marketing operations
of Delta Gizmo successfully. You, as the Marketing
Director, believe that the profitability of the company
is mainly dependent on the success of its marketing
operation. Therefore, you feel that your position is su-
perior to the other positions reporting to the CEO. You
personally believe that, since your appointment as the
Marketing Director, the success of Delta Gizmo has
been due primarily to the excellent job you have done
in marketing the products, leading to strongly increas-
ing sales over the years.
The best way to increase sales, you believe, is to run
successful promotions regularly for the key products,
to keep them highly visible in the public eye. You
claim that “stretch forecasts” (i.e., forecasts adjusted
upwards from the statistical predictions given by the
computerised forecasting system) have to be made
for two important reasons: (1) to ensure that stock is
available in case a promotion is very successful and
results in unexpectedly high sales; and (2) because
higher forecasts act as an incentive for the sales staff
to do their very best. If the forecast is on the low
side, you worry that the sales staff may well adopt
a relaxed attitude, rather than putting in more effort
to reach their targets. There is now a revised bonus
system (strongly pushed by the CEO to stop the over-
forecasting) which has been designed to counter this
possibility, but you are not so sure of its effects. After
all, “stretch forecasts” have worked well in the past
and you do not think that the cost of extra stock
is your problem. You are also eager to make sure
that the final forecasts reflect the considerable Market
Intelligence you bring to the Forecast Committee.
You are concerned that the Forecasting Executive
is too keen on the computer forecasts. Furthermore,
you believe that his/her knowledge of forecasting is
a bit doubtful at times. You are also worried that
the Production Executive is becoming increasingly
forceful in seeking to lower the forecasts. S/he does
not even mind taking it to the point where, as
happened in a few instances last year, the stock ran out
completely, costing the company lost sales. You have
been mentioning this regularly to keep him/her aware
of the risks of dropping the forecasts.B.3. The Production Director
The Production Director is one of the executives
who report directly to the CEO. The major respon-
sibility of this position is to run a successful opera-
tion of Delta Gizmo’s manufacturing facility. You, as
the Production Director, believe that the profitability
of the company is mainly dependent on the success
of its manufacturing operations in reducing the pro-
duction costs. Therefore, you feel that your position
is superior to the other positions reporting to the CEO.
You personally believe that, since your appointment as
the Production Director, the success of Delta Gizmo
has been due primarily to the excellent job you have
done in the manufacturing facility, resulting in strong
decreases in costs each year. Over the last few years,
the unit costs have been driven down by persistent im-
provements in the manufacturing process, as well as
through the intense involvement of all of the manufac-
turing employees in the improvement program.
You firmly feel that there is strong evidence sup-
porting your belief that the reduction in the cost base
has been the major reason for the strong sales growth.
Thus, you disapprove of the overly proud behaviour
of the Marketing Director, who seeks to take all of the
credit for the sales growth for himself/herself. Further-
more, you are upset that so much money has been lost
over the last few years in excessive inventory due to
overly optimistic sales forecasts. This has been, you
believe, the result of the Marketing Director’s insis-
tence on “stretch forecasts” — i.e., his pressure to ad-
just the forecasts upwards from the statistical predic-
tions given by the computerised forecasting system.
Hence, you are determined to do what you can to make
sure that the forecasts are realistic. This may be diffi-
cult, as the Marketing Director is a strong individual,
and if they do run out of stock due to your actions, you
know you will be held responsible. This has happened
a few times in the last year and they still remind you
of those instances in the meetings.
Appendix C. Sample form given to participants in
the ‘Forecasting Executive’ role
See Fig. C.1.
Last promotion period: 11
Model forecast for period 12: 141
Script for your role as the Forecasting Executive:
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“The model forecast seems not to have taken the
impact of a promotion in the last period into consid-
eration. A more dramatic fall in the sales is generally
observed in the period immediately following a pro-
motion. Thus, this base forecast needs to be adjusted to
take this impact into consideration. It would be much
more realistic to set it lower than the model forecast”.
Your forecast for period 12:
Appendix D. Sample form given to participants in
the ‘Marketing Director’ role
See Fig. C.1.
Last promotion period: 11
Model forecast for period 12: 141
Script for your role as the Marketing Director:
“It is true that the sales typically fall markedly
following a promotion period. However, for this
product we do not expect that it will fall below the
ongoing average sales. Therefore, we believe that the
forecast can be set higher”.
Your forecast for period 12:
Appendix E. Sample form given to participants in
the ‘Production Director’ role
See Fig. C.1.
Last promotion period: 11Model forecast for period 12: 141
Script for your role as the Production Director:
“Sales usually hit a dip right after a promotion.
This forecast does not appear to take such an impact
into consideration sufficiently. We need to be really
careful and reduce the forecast so that we do not end
up with a huge inventory. Our suggestion is to set a
lower figure”.
Your forecast for period 12:
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